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Abstract—We consider a problem of analyzing a global prop-
erty of private data through randomized responses subject
to a certain rule, where private data are used for another
cryptographic protocol, e.g., authentication. For this problem,
the security of private data was evaluated by a universally
composable security measure, which can be regarded as (0, δ)-
differential privacy. Here we focus on the trade-off between the
global accuracy and a universally composable security measure,
and derive an optimal solution to the trade-off problem. More
precisely, we adopt the Fisher information of a certain distri-
bution family as the estimation accuracy of a global property
and impose (0, δ)-differential privacy on a randomization mech-
anism protecting private data. Finally, we maximize the Fisher
information under the (0, δ)-differential privacy constraint and
obtain an optimal mechanism explicitly.
Index Terms—universally composable security measure, (0, δ)-
differential privacy, l1-norm, Fisher information, parameter es-
timation, sublinear function
I. INTRODUCTION
For many applications, it is of great interest in estimating
a global property of an ensemble while protecting individual
privacy. In these scenarios, disclosed data are randomized to
protect individual privacy, but it causes uncertainty to the
global property. This fact implies a trade-off between global
accuracy and individual privacy. This paper focuses on a
scenario of answering YES/NO question, where the goal is
to estimate the number of YES’s (labeled as “1”) or NO’s
(labeled as “0”) with high accuracy, given that respondents
randomize their responses to protect individual privacy.
More specifically, we assume that an investigator is in-
terested only in the ratio 1 − θ : θ of the binary private
data, where θ is a real number between zero and one. The
investigator randomly chooses n individuals to ask for their
private data. If selected individuals directly sent their private
data X ∈ X := {0, 1} to the investigator, then their private
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data could be completely leaked to the investigator. To protect
individual privacy, we use the following scheme [1], [2]: when
private data is X = 0, the individual generates a disclosed data
Y ∈ Y subject to a distribution p0 on a probability space Y
and sends it to the investigator. In the following, the sets X
and Y are called the private data set and the disclosed data
set, and |S| denotes the number of elements of a set S. When
private data is X = 1, the individual generates a disclosed
data Y subject to another distribution p1 on Y and sends it to
the investigator.
To analyze estimation of the ratio 1−θ : θ, we introduce the
parametrized distribution pθ defined as pθ = (1−θ)p0+θp1. In
this way, the estimation of the ratio 1− θ : θ is reduced to the
estimation of the parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] of the distribution family
{pθ}θ∈[0,1] when n data are generated from the same unknown
distribution pθ independently, as we allow duplication in the
selection of individuals. In literatures [3]–[5] of statistical pa-
rameter estimation, it is well-known that an optimal estimator
is given as the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) with
respect to sufficiently large n data. The error of the MLE
is asymptotically characterized by the inverse of the Fisher
information Jθ , which is called the Crame´r-Rao bound. Thus
we adopt the Fisher information Jθ as the estimation accuracy.
In addition to the above scenario, it is natural to use private
data as resources for another cryptographic protocol like an
authentication protocol [6]. In fact, we often use private data,
e.g., birthday, to identify an individual. In this case, we need
to guarantee the security of the whole protocol. That is, if
a part of information of private data is leaked, we need to
consider its effect to the cryptographic protocol that uses
private data. In the cryptography community, to evaluate the
security of the whole protocol, a security measure based on
the l1-norm is proposed as a universally composable (UC)
security measure [7]. If the UC-security measure of the first
protocol equals δ and that of the second protocol equals δ′,
then that of the combined protocol is upper bounded by δ+δ′.
This property is called universal composability. Thanks to
this property, the l1-norm is widely accepted as a security
measure in the communities of cryptography and information-
theoretic security [8]–[10]. Thus, when using private data for
a cryptographic protocol, we need to guarantee that the UC-
security measure is upper bonded by a certain threshold. On
the other hand, as a privacy measure, Kairouz et al. [11]
focused on (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy and maximized the Fisher
information Jθ under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy constraint.
Differential privacy (DP) is a standard privacy measure that
is widely accepted and introduced by [12] and [13]. (For the
definition, see (2) in Section II.) However, (ǫ, 0)-differential
privacy does not have the universally composable property
for private data. Therefore, we need to address the trade-off
between the Fisher information and the UC-security measure.
In our setting, the UC-security measure is given as the
variational distance d1(p0, p1) := (1/2)‖p0 − p1‖1 between
two distributions p0 and p1, where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the l1-norm.
The variational distance also has the following meaning: if an
adversary tries to distinguish private date, the minimum value
of the average error probability equals minS⊂Y{(1/2)p0(S)+
(1/2)p1(S
c)} = (1/2)(1− d1(p0, p1)), where Sc denotes the
complement of S. Fortunately, it can be regarded as (0, δ)-
differential privacy. Thus we can also say that we maximize
the Fisher information Jθ under the (0, δ)-differential privacy
constraint.
Further, to address the above maximization, we encounter
a new aspect that never appeared in preceding studies for the
trade-off between the Fisher information and (ǫ, 0)-differential
privacy. Kairouz et al. [11] maximized (non-explicitly) the
Fisher information under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy con-
straint when |X |, |Y| ≥ 2. Then they showed that the
maximization under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy constraint
achieves the maximum value even when |X | = |Y|. Holohan
et al. [14] considered the maximization under the (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy constraint1. However, they assumed |X | =
|Y| = 2. Therefore, this kind of maximization has been open
for a general disclosed data set Y even if |X | = 2. To find an
optimal mechanism in our framework, we need to maximize
the Fisher information for a general disclosed data set Y . In
fact, we can show that the maximization under the (0, δ)-
differential privacy constraint achieves the maximum value
only when |Y| > |X |. As a result, we obtain a randomized
response scheme with |X | = 2 and |Y| = 3 that has been
never obtained in preceding studies. Our optimal solution is
completely different from those of [11] and [14]. To handle
the case with |Y| > |X |, we need to address an additional case
that is more complicated than the case with |X | = |Y|. Table I
summarizes the relation among [11], [14] and this paper.
Since the l1-norm represents the minimum value of the
average error probability in distinguishing private data, it
is natural to consider the minimum value of the weighted
error probability minS⊂Y{(1 − w)p0(S) + wp1(Sc)} with
an arbitrary weight w ∈ (0, 1). In this case, it equals
(1/2)(1 − ‖(1 − w)p0 − wp1‖1). Hence we consider the
extended trade-off including ‖(1 − w)p0 − wp1‖1 instead of
d1(p0, p1). Furthermore, this paper also addresses the follow-
ing scenario: when the true parameter is known to be θ1 or
1Although (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy prevents blatant non-privacy [15],
blatant non-privacy is related to the privacy of data sequences. This relation
is out of our focus because our main interest is individual privacy.
TABLE I
RELATION WITH PRECEDING STUDIES
This table shows differential privacy constraints and conditions for private
data sets X and disclosed data sets Y .
Constraint |X | |Y|
Condition
for optimality
Kairouz et al. [11] (ǫ, 0)-DP ≥ 2 ≥ 2 |X | = |Y|
Holohan et al. [14] (ǫ, δ)-DP 2 2
This paper (0, δ)-DP 2 ≥ 2 |Y| ≥ 3
θ2, our problem reduces to the discrimination between two
distributions pθ1 and pθ2 . When we use an optimal testing
method, the error probability goes to zero exponentially as the
number of observations n tends to infinity. Dependently on our
setting, the optimal exponentially decreasing rate is known as
the Chernoff bound or Stein’s lemma [16], [17]. Hence we
optimize these exponents under the same constraint. To do
the above optimizations, we optimize a more general objective
function, which is the sum of values of a sublinear function,
in Section III. Although this objective function was optimized
in [11] under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy constraint, we
optimize it under the (0, δ)-differential privacy constraint.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II states the formulation of our problem and the
maximum Fisher information under the l1-norm constraint,
which describes that the maximum Fisher information depends
on the weight w and the parameter θ. Section III proves our
theorem on the maximum Fisher information by solving an
optimization with a general sublinear function. Section IV
shows that any optimal pair of two distributions p0 and p1
depends on the weight w. By applying a general result in
Section III, Section V discusses the maximization of the ex-
ponentially decreasing rate of the error probability. Section VI
explains the relation among preceding studies and this paper.
Section VII devotes concluding remarks.
II. OPTIMAL ESTIMATION
According to Fig. 1, we describe a scheme to estimate the
parameter θ. In our scheme, we first fix two distributions p0
and p1 on a finite probability space Y , which describes a con-
version rule from private data Xi ∈ X = {0, 1} to disclosed
data Yi ∈ Y . Assume that private data X1, . . . , Xn ∈ X are
independent and subject to the binary distribution parametrized
by the parameter θ ∈ (0, 1). That is, the true probability of
Xi = 0 is 1−θ and that of Xi = 1 is θ, where Xi denotes the
i-th individual’s private data. The i-th individual generates a
disclosed data Yi subject to px dependent on the value Xi = x
and then sends Yi to the investigator. From the investigator’s
viewpoint, the disclosed data Yi is given by the distribution
pθ := (1− θ)p0 + θp1.
Next, the parameter θ is estimated by the investigator
in the following way. The investigator observes n dis-
closed data Y1, . . . , Yn and employs the MLE θˆn :=
arg maxθ∈[0,1]
∑n
i=1 ln pθ(Yi), whose asymptotic optimality
is well-known [3]–[5]. That is, if n is sufficiently large, the
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Fig. 1. Estimation process of parameter θ.
MLE θˆn behaves approximately as θ+(nJθ)
−1/2Z , where Z is
a random variable subject to the standard Gaussian distribution
and Jθ is the Fisher information of the distribution family
{pθ}θ∈[0,1]:
Jθ =
∑
y∈Y
( d
dθ
ln pθ(y)
)2
pθ(y).
Therefore, the mean square error behaves as 1/nJθ. For
example, when we require the confidence level to be α, the
confidence interval is approximately given as[
θˆn +
1√
nJθ
Φ−1(α/2), θˆn +
1√
nJθ
Φ−1(1− α/2)
]
,
where Φ(y) := (2π)−1/2
∫ y
−∞
e−x
2/2 dx. In this sense, we
can conclude that the Fisher information Jθ is the estimation
accuracy.
If the investigator only observes the i-th disclosed data Yi,
the investigator can also infer, at least partially, the i-th private
data Xi. Since we assume to use the private data Xi in another
cryptographic protocol, the UC-security measure ‖p0 − p1‖1
is suitable for a privacy criterion. The UC-security measure
characterizes the distinguishability as follows. The minimum
value of the weighted error probability of the above inference
with a weight w ∈ (0, 1) isminS⊂Y{(1−w)p0(S)+wp1(Sc)},
where S is a subset of events to infer Xi = 1. When treating
two error probabilities p0(S) and p1(S
c) equally, the weight
w is one half. When taking the error probability p0(S) more
seriously than p1(S
c), the weight w is smaller than one half.
Now, the minimum value of the weighted error probability is
calculated as
min
S⊂Y
{(1−w)p0(S)+wp1(Sc)} = 1
2
(1−‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1),
which quantifies the distinguishability. Thus, to keep individ-
ual privacy a given level, we impose a constant constraint on
the l1-norm as ‖(1− w)p0 − wp1‖1 ≤ δ, which is equivalent
to the condition
min
S⊂Y
{(1− w)p0(S) + wp1(Sc)} ≥ a := 1− δ
2
. (1)
To protect individual privacy, many preceding studies con-
sider (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, which is defined by the fol-
lowing condition: for any S ⊂ Y and any i, j ∈ X ,
pi(S) ≤ eǫpj(S) + δ. (2)
When ǫ = 0, the above condition can be simplified to
(1/2)‖p0 − p1‖ ≤ δ. Thus we can also say that the l1-
norm constraint is (0, δ)-differential privacy when w = 1/2.
As explained in the previous paragraph, we also address the
minimum value of the weighted error probability as a privacy
criterion. Hence we maximize the Fisher information Jθ under
the l1-norm constraint ‖(1 − w)p0 − wp1‖1 ≤ δ. In the
following, we denote the Fisher information by Jθ(p0, p1).
From now on, we shall discuss only the case δ ∈ (0, 1)
because of the following reasons: the triangle inequality yields
‖(1 − w)p0 − wp1‖1 ≤ (1 − w) + w = 1, which implies the
inequality ‖(1 − w)p0 − wp1‖1 ≤ δ whenever δ ≥ 1; the
condition δ ≥ 1 implies that the domain of the maximization
problem is the set of all pairs of two distributions, which means
that there is no constraint; the condition δ = 0 implies that the
domain is either the empty set or the set of all pairs (p0, p1) of
two distributions with p0 = p1, which means that the Fisher
information Jθ(p0, p1) vanishes identically. Further, since the
triangle inequality yields |1 − 2w| = |(1 − w) − w| ≤ ‖(1 −
w)p0−wp1‖1, the constraint ‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1 ≤ δ implies
|1 − 2w| ≤ δ, which is equivalent to the condition a = (1 −
δ)/2 ≤ w ≤ (1 + δ)/2 = 1 − a. Hence we also impose w ∈
[a, 1−a] on w ∈ (0, 1). As the trade-off between the estimation
accuracy Jθ(p0, p1) and the individual privacy ‖(1 − w)p0 −
wp1‖1, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Assume the conditions w ∈ [a, 1− a] and δ, θ ∈
(0, 1), and set the parameters a := (1 − δ)/2 and θ0 :=
(w−a)/δ. Then we have three cases: (i) |Y| = 2 and θ ≤ θ0,
(ii) |Y| = 2 and θ > θ0, and (iii) |Y| ≥ 3. In these three
cases, from top to bottom, we have
max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
Jθ(p0, p1)
=


w − a
θ{w(1 − θ) + aθ} ,
1− w − a
(1 − θ){a(1− θ) + (1− w)θ} ,
1
θ(1 − θ)
(
1− a
w(1 − θ) + (1− w)θ
)
.
In these three cases, from top to bottom, distributions p0 and
p1 to achieve the maximum value are given as
p0 =


[1, 0],[ a
1− w , 1−
a
1− w
]
,[ a
1− w , 1−
a
1− w , 0
]
,
p1 =


[ a
w
, 1− a
w
]
,
[1, 0],[ a
w
, 0, 1− a
w
]
.
Pairs of two distributions in the cases (iii) contain all pairs
in the case |Y| = 2. Hence the maximum Fisher information
can be achieved at least when the number of elements of the
probability space Y is three. In this case, the optimal choice
Fig. 2. The blue solid curves and the red broken curves illustrate the maximum
values in Theorem 1 when |Y| ≥ 3 and |Y| = 2, respectively. The upper
and lower figures illustrate the cases (δ, w) = (1/4, 1/2) and (δ, w) =
(1/4, 2/5), respectively.
of two distributions p0 and p1 does not depend on θ. However,
it depends on δ and w. Fig. 2 illustrates the relation between
the parameter θ and the maximum value given in Theorem 1
when the threshold δ and the weight w take the specific values.
Note that in this figure, one can readily identify the difference
between the case (iii) |Y| ≥ 3 and the case |Y| = 2 which is
the combination of (i) and (ii).
III. OPTIMIZATION WITH GENERAL SUBLINEAR FUNCTION
To prove Theorem 1 when |Y| = 3, we maximize a more
general objective function, which is the sum of values of a
sublinear function. Although this objective function was opti-
mized in [11] under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy constraint,
we optimize it under the l1-norm constraint. First, we define
sublinear functions as follows.
Definition 1. A function ψ : [0,∞)2 → R is sublinear if the
following conditions hold:
• ψ(αx, αy) = αψ(x, y) for all α > 0 and x, y ≥ 0;
• ψ(x1 + x2, y1 + y2) ≤ ψ(x1, y1) + ψ(x2, y2) for all
x1, x2, y1, y2 ≥ 0.
Any sublinear function is convex. Thus the sum of values
of a sublinear function is also convex. Conversely, if a convex
function ψ satisfies the first condition in Definition 1, then ψ
is sublinear. This fact follows from Definition 1 immediately.
Let ψ be a sublinear function and define the function Ψ as
Ψ(p0, p1) :=
∑
y∈Y
ψ(p0(y), p1(y)) (3)
for any two distributions p0 and p1. Then we can maximize
Ψ under the l1-norm constraint as follows.
Theorem 2. When the conditions |Y| ≥ 3, w ∈ [a, 1−a], and
δ ∈ (0, 1) hold, the maximization problem
max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
Ψ(p0, p1) (4)
achieves the maximum value at the ordered pair (p¯0, p¯1) of
the two distributions
p¯0 =
[ a
1− w , 1−
a
1− w , 0
]
, p¯1 =
[ a
w
, 0, 1− a
w
]
.
Proof. We regard the probability space Y as the set
{1, . . . , N}. To show this theorem, we remark a few facts.
First, the domain of the maximization problem (4) is compact
and convex. Second, the objective function is convex. Thus
the maximum value is achieved at an extreme point of the
domain. We assume that (p0, p1) is an extreme point of the
domain in the following steps.
Step 1. We show that there exists an element y ∈ Y satisfying
p0(y)p1(y) > 0 by contradiction. Suppose that any element
y ∈ Y satisfies p0(y)p1(y) = 0. This assumption implies δ =
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1 = (1−w)+w = 1, which contradicts the
assumption 0 < δ < 1. Therefore, an element y ∈ Y satisfies
p0(y)p1(y) > 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that the above element y is 1, i.e., p0(1)p1(1) > 0 by changing
elements if necessarily.
Step 2. We prove that any element y 6= 1 satisfies
p0(y)p1(y) = 0 by contradiction. Suppose p0(2)p1(2) > 0 by
changing elements if necessarily. Taking a sufficiently small
positive number ǫ, we define the distributions qk and q
′
k for
k = 0, 1 as
q0(1) = p0(1)− wǫ, q′0(1) = p0(1) + wǫ,
q0(2) = p0(2) + wǫ, q
′
0(2) = p0(2)− wǫ,
q0(y) = q
′
0(y) = p0(y) (3 ≤ y ≤ N),
q1(1) = p1(1)− (1− w)ǫ, q′1(1) = p1(1) + (1 − w)ǫ,
q1(2) = p1(2) + (1− w)ǫ, q′1(2) = p1(2)− (1 − w)ǫ,
q1(y) = q
′
1(y) = p1(y) (3 ≤ y ≤ N).
Then, for any k = 0, 1, the relations ‖(1 − w)q0 − wq1‖1 =
‖(1−w)q′0−wq′1‖1 ≤ δ, pk = (qk+q′k)/2, and qk 6= q′k hold,
which contradicts that the point (p0, p1) is an extreme point of
the domain. Thus any element y 6= 1 satisfies p0(y)p1(y) = 0.
Step 3. We show the relations
min{(1− w)p0(1), wp1(1)} ≥ a, (5)
Ψ(p0, p1) = ψ(p0(1), p1(1))
+ (1− p0(1))ψ(1, 0) + (1− p1(1))ψ(0, 1).
(6)
Using the result in Step 2, for each element y 6= 1, we can
take an element k(y) ∈ Z/2Z satisfying pk(y)+1(y) = 0. Then
the inequality
δ ≥ ‖(1− w)p0 − wp1‖1
= |(1− w)p0(1)− wp1(1)|
+ (1− w)
∑
2 ≤ y ≤ N
k(y) = 0
p0(y) + w
∑
2 ≤ y ≤ N
k(y) = 1
p1(y)
= |(1− w)p0(1)− wp1(1)|
+ (1− w)(1 − p0(1)) + w(1 − p1(1))
= |(1− w)p0(1)− wp1(1)|+ 1− (1− w)p0(1)− wp1(1)
holds, which means (5). Further, (6) is verified as follows:
Ψ(p0, p1) = ψ(p0(1), p1(1)) +
∑
2 ≤ y ≤ N
k(y) = 0
p0(y)ψ(1, 0)
+
∑
2 ≤ y ≤ N
k(y) = 1
p1(y)ψ(0, 1)
= ψ(p0(1), p1(1))
+ (1− p0(1))ψ(1, 0) + (1− p1(1))ψ(0, 1).
Step 4. In this step, assuming N ≥ 3, we show our assertion.
The sublinearity of ψ implies
Ψ(p¯0, p¯1)−Ψ(p0, p1)
(a)
=ψ
( a
1− w ,
a
w
)
+
(
1− a
1− w
)
ψ(1, 0) +
(
1− a
w
)
ψ(0, 1)
− ψ(p0(1), p1(1))
− (1− p0(1))ψ(1, 0)− (1− p1(1))ψ(0, 1)
=ψ
( a
1− w ,
a
w
)
− ψ(p0(1), p1(1))
+
(
p0(1)− a
1− w
)
ψ(1, 0) +
(
p1(1)− a
w
)
ψ(0, 1)
≥ψ
( a
1− w ,
a
w
)
− ψ
( a
1− w,
a
w
)
− ψ
(
p0(1)− a
1− w , 0
)
− ψ
(
0, p1(1)− a
w
)
+
(
p0(1)− a
1− w
)
ψ(1, 0) +
(
p1(1)− a
w
)
ψ(0, 1) (7)
(b)
=0,
where (6) and (5) have been used to obtain (a) and (b),
respectively. Therefore, Ψ(p¯0, p¯1) is the maximum value of
the maximization problem (4).
Proof of Theorem 1. To use Theorem 2, we check a few facts.
First, the Fisher information Jθ(p0, p1) can be written as
Jθ(p0, p1) =
∑
y∈Y
(p1(y)− p0(y))2
pθ(y)
. (8)
Second, the function (x, y) 7→ x2/y is convex [18, Sec-
tion 3.2.6] and thus the function ψ : [0,∞)2 → R defined
as
ψ(x, y) =


(y − x)2
(1− θ)x + θy x+ y > 0,
0 x = y = 0,
is sublinear. Hence the objective function can be written as
Jθ(p0, p1) =
∑
y∈Y ψ(p0(y), p1(y)). Therefore, Theorem 2
implies Theorem 1 when |Y| ≥ 3.
We show Theorem 1 when |Y| = 2. In this case, the
maximum value is also achieved at an extreme point of the
domain; Steps 1–3 in the proof of Theorem 2 also hold. Let
(p0, p1) be an extreme point of the domain. Then one of the
following two cases occurs:
a/w ≤ ∃x ≤ 1, p0 = [1, 0], p1 = [x, 1− x],
Jθ(p0, p1) =
(1− x)2
1− θ + θx +
1− x
θ
=
1− x
θ(1 − θ + θx) (9)
and
a/(1− w) ≤ ∃x ≤ 1, p0 = [x, 1− x], p1 = [1, 0],
Jθ(p0, p1) =
(1− x)2
(1− θ)x + θ +
1− x
1− θ
=
1− x
(1− θ){(1 − θ)x+ θ} ,
(10)
where note (5). The values (9) and (10) strictly decrease as
x increases. Thus we obtain x = a/w and x = a/(1 − w)
in the first and second cases, respectively. Then the difference
between the right-hand sides of (9) and (10) equals
1− a/w
θ(1− θ + θa/w) −
1− a/(1− w)
(1− θ){(1 − θ)a/(1− w) + θ}
=
w − a
θ{(1− θ)w + θa} −
1− w − a
(1− θ){(1− θ)a+ θ(1 − w)}
=
[
(w − a)(1− θ){a(1− θ) + (1− w)θ}
− (1− w − a)θ{w(1 − θ) + aθ}]/
θ(1 − θ){(1− θ)w + θa}{(1− θ)a+ θ(1 − w)}.
This numerator is calculated as follows:
(w − a)(1 − θ){a(1− θ) + (1− w)θ}
− (1− w − a)θ{w(1− θ) + aθ}
=θ(1− θ){(w − a)(1− w) − (1− w − a)w}
+ (w − a)a(1− θ)2 − (1− w − a)aθ2
=θ(1− θ)(2w − 1)a+ {w(1− θ)2 − (1− w)θ2}a
+ {θ2 − (1− θ)2}a2
=θ(1− θ)(2w − 1)a+ {w(2θ2 − 2θ + 1)− θ2}a
+ (2θ − 1)a2
=(w − θ)a+ (2θ − 1)a2 = a{(2a− 1)θ + w − a}
=a(−δθ + w − a) = aδ(θ0 − θ).
Therefore, Theorem 1 has been proved.
IV. DEPENDENCE ON WEIGHT
When |Y| ≥ 3, the optimal pair in Theorem 1 depends
on the weight w. We are interested in whether we can take
an optimal pair that is independent of the weight w. Strictly
speaking, we are interested in whether there exists an ordered
pair (p0, p1) such that for any weight w ∈ [a, 1 − a] the
value Jθ(p0, p1) is the maximum value. The following theorem
answers this question.
Theorem 3. Assume |Y| ≥ 3. If an ordered pair (p0, p1) of
two distributions achieves the maximum value in Theorem 1,
then any element y ∈ Y with p0(y)p1(y) > 0 satisfies
(1− w)p0(y) = wp1(y). (11)
Moreover, the above ordered pair (p0, p1) satisfies
(1− w)
∑
p1(y)>0
p0(y) = w
∑
p0(y)>0
p1(y) = a. (12)
Conversely, if an ordered pair (p0, p1) satisfies the above two
conditions, then it achieves the maximum value in Theorem 1.
Indeed, the pair (p¯0, p¯1) given in Theorem 2 satisfies the
two conditions in Theorem 3. Actually, when |Y| = 3, the pair
(p¯0, p¯1) is a unique optimal pair up to rearrangement of (p0
and p1’s) components. The case |Y| > 3 yields some degrees
of freedom. In fact, all optimal pairs (p0, p1) can be written
as
p0 =
[ a
1− wb1, . . . ,
a
1− wbr1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
,
(
1− a
1− w
)
br1+1, . . . ,
(
1− a
1− w
)
br2︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2−r1
,
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r3−r2
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Y|−r3
]
,
p1 =
[ a
w
b1, . . . ,
a
w
br1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2−r1
,
(
1− a
w
)
br2+1, . . . ,
(
1− a
w
)
br3︸ ︷︷ ︸
r3−r2
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Y|−r3
]
up to rearrangement of (p0 and p1’s) components, where
b1, . . . , b|Y| are arbitrary non-negative numbers satisfying∑r1
y=1 by =
∑r2
y=r1+1
by =
∑r3
y=r2+1
by =
∑|Y|
y=r3+1
by = 1,
and 1 ≤ r1 < r2 < r3 ≤ |Y| are arbitrary integers. Hence
the parameters b1, . . . , b|Y|, r1, r2, and r3 describe degrees of
freedom in the case |Y| > 3.
Further, Theorem 3 yields the following corollary immedi-
ately.
Corollary 1. Assume |Y| ≥ 3. Then, for any two distinct
weights. no ordered pair of two distributions achieves the
maximum value in Theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Fixing a threshold δ, we assume that
an ordered pair (p0, p1) of two distributions achieves the
maximum value in Theorem 1 for some weight w. Then
Theorem 3 yields
∑
p0(y)>0
p1(y) = a/w. Since any weight
w′ 6= w satisfies ∑p0(y)>0 p1(y) = a/w 6= a/w′, Theorem 3
implies that the ordered pair (p0, p1) does not achieve the
maximum value in Theorem 1 for the weight w′. Therefore, for
any two distinct weights, no ordered pair of two distributions
achieves the maximum value in Theorem 1.
Now, in order to prove Theorem 3, we need the equality
condition of the convexity inequality of Jθ. That is, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let qk and q
′
k with k = 0, 1 be distributions on
Y , and θ and t be real numbers with 0 < θ, t < 1. Then the
equation
Jθ((1−t)q0+tq′0, (1−t)q1+tq′1) = (1−t)Jθ(q0, q1)+tJθ(q′0, q′1)
holds if and only if any element y ∈ Y satisfies
det
[
q1(y) q0(y)
q′1(y) q
′
0(y)
]
= 0. (13)
Proof. First, we see the equality condition of the convexity
inequality of the convex function g(x, y) := x2/y defined for
any real number x and any positive number y. Let 0 < t < 1,
xi ∈ R, and yi > 0 for i = 0, 1. Putting xt := (1− t)x0+ tx1
and yt := (1− t)y0 + ty1, we have
(1− t)g(x0, y0) + tg(x1, y1)− g(xt, yt)
={(1− t)x20y1yt + tx21y0yt − x2t y0y1}/y0y1yt
={(1− t)2x20y0y1 + (1 − t)tx20y21 + t(1− t)x21y20 + t2x21y0y1
− (1 − t)2x20y0y1 − t2x21y0y1 − 2t(1− t)x0x1y0y1}/y0y1yt
=t(1− t)(x20y21 + x21y20 − 2x0x1y0y1)/y0y1yt
=t(1− t)(x0y1 − x1y0)2/y0y1yt ≥ 0.
Therefore, the equation g(xt, yt) = (1 − t)g(x0, y0) +
tg(x1, y1) holds if and only if
det
[
x0 y0
x1 y1
]
= 0.
Next, we see the equality condition of the convexity in-
equality of the convex function f defined as
f(x, y) :=


(y − x)2
(1− θ)x + θy x+ y > 0,
0 x = y = 0.
Let 0 < t < 1 and xi, yi ≥ 0 for i = 0, 1, and let xt :=
(1 − t)x0 + tx1 and yt := (1 − t)y0 + ty1. First, assume
xi + yi > 0 for i = 0, 1. Noting the equality condition of the
convexity inequality of g, we find that the equation f(xt, yt) =
(1 − t)f(x0, y0) + tf(x1, y1) holds if and only if
det
[
y0 − x0 (1− θ)x0 + θy0
y1 − x1 (1− θ)x1 + θy1
]
= 0.
The left-hand side of this equation equals
det
[
y0 − x0 x0
y1 − x1 x1
]
= det
[
y0 x0
y1 x1
]
.
Thus the equation f(xt, yt) = (1 − t)f(x0, y0) + tf(x1, y1)
holds if and only if
det
[
y0 x0
y1 x1
]
= 0. (14)
Second, when x0 = y0 = 0 or x1 = y1 = 0, it can be easily
checked that the equations f(xt, yt) = (1 − t)f(x0, y0) +
tf(x1, y1) and (14) hold. Therefore, summarizing the above
two cases, we find that the equation f(xt, yt) = (1 −
t)f(x0, y0)+ tf(x1, y1) holds if and only if the equation (14)
holds.
Finally, we show this lemma. Since the Fisher information
Jθ(p0, p1) can be written as (8), the equality condition (13)
of the convexity inequality of Jθ follows from that of f .
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that an ordered pair (p0, p1) of
two distributions achieves the maximum value in Theorem 1
when |Y| ≥ 3.
Step 1. In the same way as Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2,
it is shown that there exists an element y ∈ Y such that
p0(y)p1(y) > 0. By changing elements if necessarily, we may
assume that there exist three elements r1, r2, and r3 with
1 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r3 ≤ N such that
p0(y)p1(y) > 0 (1 ≤ y ≤ r1),
p0(y) > 0, p1(y) = 0 (r1 < y ≤ r2),
p0(y) = 0, p1(y) > 0 (r2 < y ≤ r3),
p0(y) = 0, p1(y) = 0 (r3 < y ≤ N).
Then (11) and (12) turn to
(1− w)p0(y) = wp1(y) (1 ≤ y ≤ r1), (15)
(1− w)
r1∑
y=1
p0(y) = w
r1∑
y=1
p1(y) = a, (16)
respectively.
Step 2. In this step, assuming r1 ≥ 2, we show (15). Define
the distributions qk and q
′
k for k = 0, 1 in the same way as
Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2. Then, for any k = 0, 1, the
relations
‖(1− w)q0 − wq1‖1 = ‖(1− w)q′0 − wq′1‖1 ≤ δ,
pk = (qk + q
′
k)/2, qk 6= q′k
hold. Since the function Jθ is convex and the value Jθ(p0, p1)
is the maximum value, we have
Jθ(p0, p1) ≤ 1
2
Jθ(q0, q1) +
1
2
Jθ(q
′
0, q
′
1) ≤ Jθ(p0, p1).
Then Lemma 1 implies
0 = det
[
q1(1) q0(1)
q′1(1) q
′
0(1)
]
= det
[
q1(1) q0(1)
q′1(1)− q1(1) q′0(1)− q0(1)
]
= det
[
q1(1) q0(1)
2(1− w)ǫ 2wǫ
]
= 2ǫ det
[
p1(1) p0(1)
1− w w
]
= −2ǫ{(1− w)p0(1)− wp1(1)},
whence (1− w)p0(1)− wp1(1) = 0. Lemma 1 also implies
0 = det
[
q1(2) q0(2)
q′1(2) q
′
0(2)
]
= det
[
q1(2) q0(2)
q′1(2)− q1(2) q′0(2)− q0(2)
]
= det
[
q1(2) q0(2)
−2(1− w)ǫ −2wǫ
]
= −2ǫ det
[
p1(2) p0(2)
1− w w
]
= 2ǫ{(1− w)p0(2)− wp1(2)},
whence (1 − w)p0(2) − wp1(2) = 0. Replacing the above
element 2 with y = 3, . . . , r1, we can show the equation (1−
w)p0(y)− wp1(y) = 0 in the same way.
Step 3. We show (16). Assume r1 = 1. In this case, note that
(16) contains (15). In the same way as Step 3 in the proof of
Theorem 2, the relations (5) and (6) hold. Then (7) must be the
equality because the value Jθ(p0, p1) = Ψ(p0, p1) equals the
maximum value Jθ(p¯0, p¯1) = Ψ(p¯0, p¯1). Hence the equations
ψ(p0(1), p1(1)) = ψ
(
p0(1),
a
w
)
+ ψ
(
0, p1(1)− a
w
)
,
ψ
(
p0(1),
a
w
)
= ψ
( a
1− w,
a
w
)
+ ψ
(
p0(1)− a
1− w , 0
)
follow, where ψ equals f in the proof of Lemma 1. Using the
equality condition of the convexity inequality of ψ and noting
that ψ is sublinear, we obtain
0 = det
[
a/w p0(1)
p1(1)− a/w 0
]
= −p0(1)(p1(1)− a/w),
0 = det
[
a/w a/(1− w)
0 p0(1)− a/(1− w)
]
= (a/w)(p0(1)− a/(1− w)),
whence (1− w)p0(1) = wp1(1) = a.
Assume r1 ≥ 2. The result in Step 2 and the sublinearity
of ψ imply
Ψ(p0, p1)
=ψ
( r1∑
y=1
p0(y),
r1∑
y=1
p1(y)
)
+
(
1−
r1∑
y=1
p0(y)
)
ψ(1, 0) +
(
1−
r1∑
y=1
p1(y)
)
ψ(0, 1).
Hence the equation (1−w)∑r1y=1 p0(y) = w∑r1y=1 p1(y) = a
follows from the same argument in the previous paragraph.
(Replace pk(1) with
∑r1
y=1 pk(y).) Summarizing the two cases
r1 = 1 and r1 ≥ 2, we obtain (16).
Step 4. Finally, we show the converse part. In this step,
we use the same notations Ψ and ψ as Step 3. Take an
arbitrary ordered pair (p0, p1) satisfying the two conditions
in Theorem 3. Then the converse part is verified as follows:
Ψ(p0, p1)
=
∑
p0(y)p1(y)>0
ψ(p0(y), p1(y))
+
∑
p0(y)p1(y)=0
p0(y)ψ(1, 0) +
∑
p0(y)p1(y)=0
p1(y)ψ(0, 1)
(a)
=ψ
( ∑
p0(y)p1(y)>0
p0(y),
∑
p0(y)p1(y)>0
p1(y)
)
+
(
1−
∑
p0(y)p1(y)>0
p0(y)
)
ψ(1, 0)
+
(
1−
∑
p0(y)p1(y)>0
p1(y)
)
ψ(0, 1)
(b)
=ψ
( a
1− w ,
a
w
)
+
(
1− a
1− w
)
ψ(1, 0) +
(
1− a
w
)
ψ(0, 1)
=Ψ(p¯0, p¯1),
where (11) and (12) have been used to obtain (a) and (b),
respectively.
V. OPTIMAL DISCRIMINATION
Next, we assume that the true parameter is known to be
either θ1 or θ2. Under this assumption, we need to discriminate
the two distributions pθ1 and pθ2 . Then there are two kinds of
error probabilities. One is the error probability Pθ2→θ1 that we
incorrectly identity the parameter to be θ1 while the correct
parameter is θ2. The other is the error probability Pθ1→θ2
that we incorrectly identity the parameter to be θ2 while the
correct parameter is θ1. When n data Y1, . . . , Yn are observed,
we employ the likelihood ratio test: we support pθ1 when∑n
i=1 ln(pθ1(Yi)/pθ2(Yi)) is greater than a certain threshold;
otherwise we support pθ2 . The likelihood ratio test is known as
the optimal method for this discrimination [19, Chapter 2, Sec-
tion 3]. In the symmetric setting, we focus on the average of
the above two error probabilities: (1/2)Pθ2→θ1+(1/2)Pθ1→θ2 .
In this setting, when the threshold is chosen to be zero, the
likelihood test realizes the minimum average error probability,
which goes to zero exponentially as n → ∞. The exponen-
tially decreasing rate is known as the Chernoff bound [16],
[17]
sup
−1<s<0
(−s)D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2),
where the relative Re´nyi entropy D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2) is defined as

1
s
ln
∑
y∈Y
pθ1(y)
1+spθ2(y)
−s s ∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0,∞),
∑
y∈Y
pθ1(y) ln
pθ1(y)
pθ2(y)
s = 0.
When s = 0, it is simply called the relative entropy and
denoted asD(pθ1‖pθ2). To guarantee the privacy for individual
data, in the same way as Section II, we impose a constant
constraint on the l1-norm as ‖(1−w)p0 −wp1‖1 ≤ δ, which
is equivalent to the condition (1). Therefore, the value
max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
sup
−1<s<0
(−s)D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2)
= sup
−1<s<0
(−s) max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2) (17)
expresses the maximum exponentially decreasing rate of the
average of the two error probabilities under the above privacy
condition.
We often focus on an asymmetric setting, in which, we
impose the constant constraint on the error probability Pθ1→θ2
and then minimize the other error probability Pθ2→θ1 . In this
case, the minimum value of Pθ2→θ1 goes to zero exponentially.
As known as Stein’s lemma [17, Theorem 12.8.1], the maxi-
mum exponentially decreasing rate is known to be the relative
entropy D(pθ1‖pθ2). When we impose a constant constraint
on the l1-norm as ‖(1−w)p0 −wp1‖1 ≤ δ, the maximum of
the above exponent is max‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δD(pθ1‖pθ2).
As another setting, when we impose the exponentially
decreasing rate of Pθ1→θ2 to be greater than or equal to r, the
maximum exponentially decreasing rate of Pθ2→θ1 is known
[20] to be
sup
−1<s<0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)}.
This value is called the Hoeffding bound. Therefore, when we
impose a constant constraint on the l1-norm as ‖(1−w)p0 −
wp1‖1 ≤ δ, the maximum of the above exponent is
max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
sup
−1<s<0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)}
= sup
−1<s<0
s
1 + s
{
r − max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)
}
.
(18)
Further, if the exponentially decreasing rate of Pθ2→θ1 is
greater than the relative entropy D(pθ1‖pθ2), the other error
probability Pθ1→θ2 goes to one [21]. In this case, we often
focus on the exponentially decreasing rate of 1 − Pθ2→θ1 ,
in which, a smaller exponent of this value is better. When
we impose the exponentially decreasing rate of Pθ1→θ2 to
be greater than or equal to r, the minimum exponentially
decreasing rate of 1− Pθ2→θ1 is known [22] to be
sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)}.
This value is called the Han-Kobayashi bound. When similar
to (18), we impose a constant constraint on the l1-norm as
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1 ≤ δ, the minimum of the above exponent
is
min
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)}. (19)
Since min‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ and sups>0 are optimizations
with the opposite direction, further analysis is not so trivial.
First, we tackle the above maximization problems except for
(19), which can be solved as a special case of Theorem 2. To
address these problems, we introduce the f -divergence [23]
Df (pθ1‖pθ2) :=
∑
y∈Y
pθ2(y)f
(pθ1(y)
pθ2(y)
)
,
where f : (0,∞) → R is a convex function. When a convex
function f is chosen as f(x) = −x1+s for s ∈ (−1, 0) and
f(x) = x1+s for s ∈ (0,∞), the relative Re´nyi entropy can
be recovered:
D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2)
=


1
s
ln{−Df(pθ1‖pθ2)} s ∈ (−1, 0),
1
s
lnDf (pθ1‖pθ2) s ∈ (0,∞).
(20)
Moreover, when f(x) = x lnx, the f -divergenceDf (pθ1‖pθ2)
equals the relative entropy D(pθ1‖pθ2).
To apply Theorem 2, we define the function ψ : [0,∞)2 →
R as
ψ(x, y)
=


((1 − θ2)x+ θ2y)f
( (1− θ1)x+ θ1y
(1− θ2)x+ θ2y
)
x+ y > 0,
0 x = y = 0.
(21)
The convexity of f implies that the function (x, y) 7→ yf(x/y)
is also convex [18, Section 3.2.6]. In addition, the function
ψ satisfies the first condition in Definition 1, ψ is sublinear.
Under the definition (21), the function Ψ defined in (3) equals
the f -divergence Df (pθ1‖pθ2). Hence Theorem 2 implies the
following theorem.
Theorem 4. When f is a convex function and the conditions
|Y| ≥ 3, w ∈ [a, 1− a], and δ, θ1, θ2 ∈ (0, 1) hold, we have
max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
Df(pθ1‖pθ2)
=a
(1− θ2
1− w +
θ2
w
)
f
((1− θ1)w + θ1(1− w)
(1− θ2)w + θ2(1− w)
)
+
(
1− a
1− w
)
(1 − θ2)f
(1− θ1
1− θ2
)
+
(
1− a
w
)
(1 − θ2)f
(θ1
θ2
)
,
which is achieved by the ordered pair (p¯0, p¯1) given in
Theorem 2.
The relative Re´nyi entropy D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2) with s ∈
(−1, 0) ∪ (0,∞) is the composite function with a monotone
function and the f -divergence (see (20)). Further, the relative
Re´nyi entropy D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2) with s = 0 is just the f -
divergence (when f(x) = x lnx). Thus we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. When the conditions |Y| ≥ 3, w ∈ [a, 1 − a],
and δ, θ1, θ2 ∈ (0, 1) hold, we have
max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
D1+s(pθ1‖pθ2)
=


1
s
ln
[ a
w(1 − w)
{(1− θ1)w + θ1(1− w)}1+s
{(1− θ2)w + θ2(1− w)}s
+
(
1− a
1− w
)(1 − θ1)1+s
(1 − θ2)s +
(
1− a
w
)θ1+s1
θs2
]
s ∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0,∞),
a
w(1 − w){(1− θ1)w + θ1(1− w)}
· ln (1− θ1)w + θ1(1− w)
(1− θ2)w + θ2(1− w)
+
(
1− a
1− w
)
(1 − θ1) ln 1− θ1
1− θ2 +
(
1− a
w
)
θ1 ln
θ1
θ2
s = 0,
which is achieved by the ordered pair (p¯0, p¯1) given in
Theorem 2.
Using the above corollary, we can optimize the Chernoff
bound (17) and the Hoeffding bound (18) under the constraint
‖(1 − w)p0 − wp1‖1 ≤ δ, by choosing the two distributions
p¯0 and p¯1 given in Theorem 2.
To understand Corollary 2 visually, we have provided Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 illustrates the relation between the pair (θ1, θ2) of the
two parameters and the maximum value given in Corollary 2
when the threshold δ, the weight w, and the parameter s take
the specific values.
Fig. 3. The colored surfaces illustrate the maximum values in Corollary 2
when s = 0. The upper and lower figures illustrate the cases (δ, w) =
(1/4, 1/2) and (δ, w) = (1/4, 2/5), respectively.
Finally, we address the minimization problem (19). Using
the pair (p¯0, p¯1) given in Corollary 2, we have
min
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)}
≥ sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{
r − max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)
}
(a)
= sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(p¯θ2‖p¯θ1)}
≥ min
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)},
where (a) follows from Corollary 2. Therefore, the minimum
exponent (19) is given by
sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{
r − max
‖(1−w)p0−wp1‖1≤δ
D1+s(pθ2‖pθ1)
}
=sup
s>0
s
1 + s
{r −D1+s(p¯θ2‖p¯θ1)}.
Hence this minimum exponent can be calculated by using
Corollary 2.
TABLE II
COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RESULTS BASED ON UC-SECURITY
MEASURE
This table shows optimal pairs of two distributions p0 and p1 in [1], [2], [14],
and ours.
Scheme |Y| Optimal pair of two distributions
Warner [1] 2
p0 = [(1 + δ)/2, (1 − δ)/2]
p1 = [(1 − δ)/2, (1 + δ)/2]
Unrelated question [2] 2
p0 = [δ + (1− δ)(1 − η), (1 − δ)η]
p1 = [(1− δ)(1 − η), δ + (1 − δ)η]
Holohan et al. [14] 2
θ ≤ 1/2 θ > 1/2
p0 = [1, 0] p0 = [1− δ, δ]
p1 = [1− δ, δ] p1 = [1, 0]
This paper 3
p0 = [2a, 1− 2a, 0] = [1− δ, δ, 0]
p1 = [2a, 0, 1− 2a] = [1− δ, 0, δ]
VI. RELATED WORK
Here we compare our result with preceding studies. The
earlier studies [1], [2] discussed the estimation error in a
similar way, but they did not give any privacy criteria. Warner
[1] proposed a scheme to protect individual privacy, in which
each individual flips each true answer with probability 1− π
and does not flip it with probability π ∈ (0, 1). That is,
he proposed to set p0 and p1 as p0 = [π, 1 − π] and
p1 = [1− π, π] in our notation. Greenberg et al. [2] proposed
another scheme by using a question unrelated to an intended
YES/NO question. In their scheme, the investigator asks each
individual both the intended question and the unrelated one.
The asked individual answers the former with probability
π ∈ (0, 1) and the latter with probability 1 − π. When the
unrelated question has the true ratio η : 1−η, the distributions
p0 and p1 are set to p0 = [π + (1− π)(1 − η), (1− π)η] and
p1 = [(1−π)(1−η), π+(1−π)η] in our notation. Maximizing
the Fisher information in two sets of the above respective
pairs (p0, p1), we obtain the optimal pairs in Table II. Our
scheme is best of the pairs in Table II because our scheme
is to maximize the Fisher information in the set of all pairs
of two distributions. Moreover, the studies [1], [2] did not
consider the Fisher information and considered only the case
|X | = |Y| = 2. Hence, even if their schemes are optimized,
it is impossible to surpass our optimal performance not only
the blue broken curves but also the red solid curves in Fig. 2.
This impossibility is illustrated in Fig. 4.
As a privacy measure, many studies adopt differential pri-
vacy. More precisely, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is usually used.
In our setting, it is defined as (2). On the one hand, (ǫ, 0)-
differential privacy evaluates the maximum of the correct
guessing probability of a private data Xi when knowing a
disclosed data Yi. On the other hand, (0, δ)-differential privacy
evaluates the average of the correct guessing probability. The
relation between (0, δ)-differential privacy and the average
error probability has been already explained in Section I.
The studies [11], [14], [24] are closely related to this paper.
Holohan et al. [14] showed optimal (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
mechanisms explicitly in the case |X | = 2. However, they
considered only the case |Y| = 2. Hence, when ǫ = 0,
Fig. 4. (δ, w) = (1/4, 1/2). The red broken curve illustrates the maximum
value in Theorem 1 when |Y| = 2, which is also the Fisher information for the
third pair in Table II. The black solid curve illustrates the Fisher information
for the first pair in Table II. The black solid curve also illustrates the Fisher
information for the second pair with η = 1/2 in Table II.
their result [14, Theorem 3] corresponds to the case (i) in
Theorem 1, but the case (iii) in Theorem 1 is not known at
all. Their result in the case ǫ = 0 is in Table II and illustrated
by the red broken curves in Fig. 2 and 4. Kairouz et al.
[11] provided a theorem on optimal (ǫ, 0)-differentially private
mechanisms in the case |X | ≥ 2. Their theorem can be applied
to many objective functions including the Fisher information
and the f -divergence, and turns convex optimization problems
to linear programs. As stated in the previous sections, their
objective functions are the same as ours. Also, recall that the
contents of Section V can be regarded as a special case of
Theorem 2. Hence, in the case |X | = 2, Theorem 2 can
be regarded as the (0, δ)-differential privacy version of the
result in [11]. Table I in Section I summarizes the relation
among [11], [14] and this paper. Moreover, in the case X = Z,
Geng and Viswanath [24] discussed minimization of l1 and l2
cost functions under the (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy constraint
and gave lower and upper bounds of the minimum values.
As a special case, when ǫ = 0 and δ → 0, their lower and
upper bounds are equal asymptotically. Their scheme to protect
individual privacy is different from ours because their scheme
is to add uniform noise or discrete Laplacian noise to integers.
Indeed, our randomization scheme allows that added noise
depends on values of X but their scheme does not. In this
sense, our randomization scheme is more general than theirs.
There are other related works on optimization under the
differential privacy constraint. For instance, Duchi et al. [25]
evaluated the infimums of minimax-type objective functions
under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy constraint. They did not
minimize those objective functions but provided sharp lower
and upper bounds up to constant factors. The studies [26], [27]
focused on staircase mechanisms which are mixtures of a finite
number of uniform distributions, in the continuous data case.
Geng et al. [26] optimized the expectation of the l1-norm of
a disclosed data Y ∈ Rd under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy
constraint, and showed that a staircase mechanism is optimal
when d = 1, 2. Similarly, Geng and Viswanath [27] optimized
the expectations of symmetric and increasing cost functions of
a disclosed data Y ∈ Rd under the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy
constraint, and showed that staircase mechanisms are optimal
when d = 1. Also, there is a work which focused on the
relation between mutual information and differential privacy
[28].
As other privacy measures, Issa and Wagner [29] consid-
ered the decreasing exponent rate of the probability that an
eavesdropper exactly estimate a source sequence. Their privacy
measure is asymptotic, while our privacy measure is not so.
Agrawal and Aggarwal [30] focused on only the continuous
data case and adopted another privacy measure, which is given
as entropy. They defined information loss as the expectation
of the L1-metric between the true distribution and its estimate,
and discussed the trade-off relation between information loss
and privacy. Also, they proposed an expectation-maximization
algorithm as a method to estimate statistical information.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, for the trade-off problem associated with
binary private data, we have proposed a randomized mech-
anism that can maximize the estimation accuracy of a global
property while keeping individual privacy a given level. Since
we assume that private data are used for another crypto-
graphic protocol like authentication, the UC-security measure
is suitable for a privacy criterion. In our setting, the UC-
security measure is the l1-norm (1/2)‖p0 − p1‖1 and the
constraint (1/2)‖p0 − p1‖1 ≤ δ can be regarded as (0, δ)-
differential privacy. Under this constraint, we have maximized
the Fisher information that is the estimation accuracy of a
global property. In particular, to achieve the maximum value,
the set of all randomized data must consist of at least three
elements: |Y| ≥ 3. This fact is new and different from the
(ǫ, 0)-differential privacy case because the (ǫ, 0)-differential
privacy case is maximized even when |X | = |Y| [11]. We
have also extended our analysis to the maximization of the
Chernoff bound, which expresses the optimal exponentially
decreasing rate of discrimination. These results may have
practical applications in scenarios like voting and surveying.
Our optimal distributions in Theorem 2 do not depend on
objective functions; however, in the case |X | ≥ 3, optimal
mechanisms probably depend on objective functions. Hence it
is difficult to give optimal mechanisms explicitly in the case
|X | ≥ 3. (For example, when the Fisher information Jθ is an
objective function, it depends on the true parameter θ. Thus
optimal mechanisms are possible to depend on θ.) This fact is
a main trouble when extending our result to the case |X | ≥ 3.
Moreover, to optimize objective functions under the l1-norm
constraint, we must consider the general case including |X | 6=
|Y|, which is also a main trouble.
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